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1

Introduction

Environmental issues such as climate change, air and water pollution, and deterioration of the ozone layer are transboundary or global in nature. Therefore,
countries, by acting alone, can not promote significant environmental protection.
Recognizing this, they have already developed a wide range of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) to enable them to work together on global environmental issues.
A number of IEAs exists trying to implement environmental policies on sovereign countries. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol and its successor the Paris
Agreement as well as the Montreal Protocol are some of the most well known
environmental treaties. However, there is an important problem associated with
their contribution to environmental protection. They ultimately signed only by
a limited number of countries and, in general, fail to achieve their targets, thus,
climate change is still speeding. There are two important factors responsible for
this phenomenon. First, there are strong free-riding incentives created due to the
pure public good provision problem. All countries could be better of under full cooperation, but each individual country has incentives to free ride on others’ eﬀorts.
Second, there is no a supranational authority that could implement and enforce environmental policies on sovereign states. Therefore, environmental treaties should
be designed so that they are self-enforced. That is, they should provide countries
with incentives to join and remain members of the agreements.
The main body of the literature studies the formation of an IEA as a two-stage
non-cooperative game, where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to
join the agreement (coalition), while in the second they choose their emissions.
In the second stage, it is assumed that countries either choose emissions simultaneously or that the coalition acts as a leader and the non-signatory countries
follow. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the resulting two-stage game is
usually derived by applying the notions of the internal and external stability conditions (D’Aspremont et al., 1983). An IEA is considered to be stable if none of its
participating countries has an incentive to withdraw (internal stability) and none
of the non-participating countries has an incentive to further join the agreement
(external stability), assuming that the remaining players in the game do not revise
their membership decision.
Results reveal that it is very diﬃcult to induce many countries to join an inter3
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national agreement with significant reductions in emissions. Assuming quadratic
cost and benefit functions and simultaneous choice of emissions, the basic model
shows that stable coalitions consist of no more than two countries (De Cara and
Rotillon, 2001; Finus and Rundshagen, 2001; Rubio and Casino, 2001; among others). If the coalition is assumed to be a leader, the coalition formation is more
successful. Barrett (1994) suggests that a stable coalition may achieve a high
degree of cooperation, including the grand coalition. In contrast, Diamantoudi
and Sartzetakis (2006), imposing the appropriate positivity constraints on emissions, show that stable coalitions could have no more than four members. Overall,
strong free-rider incentives prevent large stable coalitions and/or large gains from
cooperation.
In light of all of the above, it is very important to extent the basic model of the
IEAs’ literature implementing diﬀerent policies that could successfully promote
international cooperation. One issue, linked with climate change, that can play
an important role in reducing the free-riding incentives and increasing countries’
willingness to cooperate, is trade. Cooperation in international environmental
issues diﬀers from most other international problems (Barrett, 2005). Environment
is a global public good, and thus in an IEA, members cannot exclude non-members
from enjoying the benefits of a better environment. On the other hand, in trade
agreements, free trade is not treated as a global public good and non-signatory
countries can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of a free trade agreement.
Some of the existing IEAs include provisions that can aﬀect trade. Specifically, trade measures can regulate or restrain the trade in particular materials or
products, either between members of the treaty and/or between members and nonmembers. For example, the Montreal Protocol contains specific trade measures in
the form of requirements for a ban on trade between parties and non-parties in
products containing or made with ozone-depleting substances (ODS). One of the
main goal of those measures was to maximize participation in the Protocol, by
excluding non-members from supplies of ODS. According to International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), some of the countries that participated
in the treaty did so because of the trade provisions. Moreover, trade sanctions
have been utilized in the Basel Convention (international transportation of hazardous waste), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES). With respect to a specific product, the U.S. has applied a penalty tax
on foreign automobile manufacturers not meeting the domestic Corporate Average
4
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Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.
The relevant literature of IEA and trade is surprisingly not so extensive. Initially, Barrett (1997) analyzes an IEA formation problem in a partial equilibrium
model with abatement and illustrates that trade sanctions can help to support
cooperation, even full cooperation, among countries. Lessmann, Marschinski, and
Edenhofer (2009) apply a dynamic model of climate coalition formation and use
trade sanctions as an instrument to promote participation. In their model, coalitions are free to impose tariﬀs on imports from non-cooperating countries. According to their results, participation in the coalition rises and global welfare also
rises along with participation.
More recently, Eichner and Pethig (2013) and (2014) study environmental
agreements in a model with international trade. Applying a cap and trade regulation, they find that international trade does not improve the conditions for the
formation of eﬀective stable climate coalitions. In particular, agreements are very
small and hence ineﬀective in reducing emissions if coalitions play Nash equilibrium
(Eichner and Pethig, 2014), however agreements may be larger but also ineﬀective
if coalitions behave as Stackelberg leaders (Eichner and Pethig, 2013). Eichner
and Pethig (2015), replacing the cap with a tax policy, demonstrate that, when
countries employ carbon taxes to fight climate change, the grand coalition is stable
(imposing some necessary and suﬃcient conditions) whether Nash or Stackelberg
approaches are assumed. In all the above-mentioned papers (Eichner and Pethig,
2013, 2014 and 2015), the formation of stable self-enforcing IEAs is examined in
a free trade world economy. Finally, another study that has explored this idea is
the paper by Nordhaus (2015). He applies a numerical general equilibrium model
and uses tariﬀ sanctions, that are taken as exogenous, to encourage participation
in climate agreements. He finds that trade penalties on non-participants induce a
large stable coalition with high levels of abatement.
The present analysis addresses an the formation of a Global Agreement (GA)
where countries (named signatories) that form an environmental agreement form
a free trade agreement as well. Nations that remain outside of the agreement
(named non-signatories) suﬀer trade costs. The advantage for the signatories is
the tariﬀ-free access to other signatories’ markets while at the same time they bare
the burden of reducing emissions more. In contrast, the disadvantage for the nonsignatories is that they have to pay tariﬀs on their imports to any other country
while free-riding on environmental eﬀorts.
5
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The main objective of the paper is to investigate the eﬀect of trade on the
stability and eﬀectiveness of environmental agreements, when all non-cooperative
countries and coalition members choose both their terms of trade and climate
policy instruments to deal with the environmental pollution. In particular, we are
interested in examining whether the presence of trade can enhance cooperation
and improve environmental performance as well as welfare relative to the basic
model of the IEAs’ literature.
Our analysis is mostly related to Eichner and Pethig (2015) in the sense that
we study IEAs in a model with symmetric countries, international trade, and
emission tax policy, however, they model a free-trade world economy. To our
knowledge, there are no relevant studies that examine the formation of GAs in a
framework similar to ours. We believe that the existence of the two instruments
(i.e. tariﬀs and taxes), even though adds complexity to the analysis, captures
better the real-world situation since trade and environmental problems aﬀect each
other. Under the formation of GA, there are two important eﬀects that have to
be taken into consideration. In an IEA, the coalition formation creates positive
externalities on non-participants. On the other hand, in trade agreements, the
coalition formation creates negative externalities on non-participants (Yi, 1997).
The interaction between these two eﬀects is essential to determine the stability
and eﬀectiveness of an agreement.
The present model is built as follows. There are two goods, one of which is responsible for the environmental problem. We assume that countries are symmetric
and goods are produced in each country by a single firm. We consider trade in the
good that generates emissions. Consumers benefit from consumption as well as
a cleaner environment. The pollution is perfectly transboundary, therefore, every
country is equally aﬀected by total emissions. We characterize the equilibrium of
a three-stage game. In the first stage, each country decides whether or not to join
the agreement. In the second stage, countries choose simultaneously - cooperatively or non-cooperatively - the tariﬀ and tax levels. In the last stage, each firm,
taking the policies set by the countries and the output decisions of the other firms
as given, maximizes its profits. To obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
the model is solved by backward induction.
Our findings illustrate the importance of trade and environmental policies working together to improve cooperation in eﬀective agreements. Moreover, contrary to
the main conclusion reached in the IEAs’ literature, the size of a stable agreement
6
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increases in the number of countries participating in the game. Clearly, if world
markets do not exist (autarky), the model coincides with the basic model of the
IEAs’ literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 presents the benchmark case. Section 4 examines the formation of a
GA. Section 5 presents the stability conditions. Section 6 analyses numerically
the eﬀect of trade on the stability and eﬀectiveness of environmental agreements.
Section 7 concludes the paper.

2

The model

We consider an open economy where countries trade with each other. We assume
that there are  identical countries,  = {1 2  }. The representative consumer
in each country  ∈  has a utility function of the form,
 ( ;  )

¶
µ
1  2

=   − ( ) +  
2

(1)

where  is country ’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good,  denotes
the numeraire good, and  and  are positive parameters, i.e.   0 and   0.
The total consumption  is given by,
 =


X

 =  +

=1

X

 

(2)

6=

where  is country ’s consumption of the domestic product and  indicates
the quantity country  imports from country  6=  (i.e. quantity sold from country
 to country ).
The quasilinear utility function, given by equation (1), is suﬃcient to derive
country ’s inverse demand function for the nonnumeraire good, that is,
 ( ) = ( −  )

(3)

The numeraire good is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale and the nonnumeraire good is produced, in each country, by a single
profit maximizing firm. For simplicity, the marginal cost of production is assumed

7
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to be constant and equal to zero. We consider that there is no pollution associated with the numeraire good, while each unit of the nonnumeraire good produced
generates one unit of pollution emission.
Country  charges a nonnegative tariﬀ at the same rate of   per unit of import from any country , where  6= . Then country ’s eﬀective marginal cost
of exporting to country  is   . Similarly, country ’s eﬀective marginal cost of
exporting to country  is   . We consider trade only in the good that generates
emissions (i.e. nonnumeraire good).
A by-product of production in this model is pollution. Pollution is perfectly
transboundary and thus aﬀects widely all countries. Country ’s production and
as a consequence polluting activity (recall the one-by-one relationship between
production of consumption good and pollution) is given by,
 =  +

X


 

(4)

6=

That is, production in country  is the sum of what the country produces and
consumes domestically (i.e.  ) and what the country produces domestically and
exports (i.e. 
 ).
The damage from pollution is monotonically increasing and convex in the global
P
emissions,  = =1  . In particular, the damage function is given by,
1
(5)
 () =  2 
2
where   0 is the pollution damage parameter, as well as  (0) = 0, 0 ≥ 0
and 00  0.
The environmental policy in country  is a carbon tax imposed per unit of
emission by the domestic firm due to its production. Given our assumption that
each unit of the polluting good produced generates one unit of pollution emission,
a tax per unit of emission is equivalent to a tax per unit of the polluting good.
The pollution (or emission) tax set in country  is denoted by  .
We model the process of countries’ decision as a non-cooperative three stage
emission game and start by solving the third stage where, taking countries’ decisions as given, firms compete a la Cournot in the product markets. In the second
stage, countries choose simultaneously - cooperatively or non-cooperatively - tariﬀ
and tax levels and in the first stage, each country decides whether or not to join
the agreement.
8
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Firm’s problem
Each firm maximizes profits taking the policies set by the countries and the
output decisions of the other firms as given. The total profits for the firm  located
in country  consist of the profits of sales in the domestic market  plus the profits
of sales (i.e. profits of output exported) in country , minus the pollution tax
imposed on emissions. Thus,
Π =

Π

+

Ã
X

Π


6=

!

−   

(6)

Firm  maximizes profits, given by equation (6), by choosing quantity sold in
country , i.e.  , and quantity sold in country , i.e. 
 , for all  6=  ∈ . Given
that firm  has a zero marginal cost of producing the homogeneous good while its
eﬀective marginal cost of exporting to country  is   , its profits can be written
as,
Π =  ( ) +

X

( ( ) −   )
 −   

(7)

6=

P

where  = =1  is country ’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
The maximization problem is,
max

  
 ∇6=∈

Π =  ( ) +

X

( ( ) −   )
 −   

(8)

6=

Country’s problem
We assume that firms’ profits and tariﬀ and tax revenues are rebated back
to the consumers. So that, country ’s welfare, denoted by  , consists of the
domestic consumer surplus  1 , the domestic firm’s profits Π (net of all taxes),
the tariﬀ revenues   , the tax revenues  and the environmental damages due
to the aggregate pollution level  (). That is,
 =  + Π +   +  −  ()

(9)

Thus, country ’s total welfare can be written as,
1

The consumer surplus  is calculated by taking,  ( ;  ) −  ( ) .

9
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X
X
1
1
 =  ( )2 +  ( ) +
( ( ) −   )
+

 −  2 


2
2
6=
6=

(10)

where the quantity 
 indicates country ’s exports to country  while the

quantity  indicates country’s  imports from country .
Country  maximizes welfare given by (10) by choosing tariﬀ level   and tax
level  . Thus, its maximization problem is,
X
X
1
1
( ( ) −   )
+

 −  2 
max  =  ( )2 +  ( ) +


  
2
2
6=
6=

3

(11)

The benchmark case

The non-cooperative outcome arises when each country  ∈  chooses its tariﬀ
and tax levels taking as given the tariﬀ and tax levels from all the other countries,
playing Nash equilibrium.
From the firms’ maximization problem (8), the first order condition with respect to the domestic quantity  gives the following expression,
 − 


X
=1

 −  −  = 0

(12)

Moreover, the first order condition with respect to the quantity exported 

gives the following expression2 ,
 − 


X
=1

 − 
 −  −   = 0

(13)

Using the first order conditions (12) and (13), we derive country ’s reaction
functions for the domestic product and the quantity exported in the benchmark
case. Thus,
2

The quantity sold (exported) from country  to country  indicates also the quantity country

 imports from country , that is 
 =  .

10
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 −  − ( − 1)
=

2

(14)

 −  −   − 

(15)

Due to symmetry, the reaction function for the quantity exported from country
 to country  (i.e. 
 ), that is the quantity imported to country , is given by,

 =

 −  −   − 


Using the reaction functions, we derive the following expressions,
 =

 =

 =

(16)

 −  + ( − 1) + ( − 1) 

( + 1)

(17)


 =

 +  − 2 − 2 

( + 1)

(18)

 =

 +  − 2 − 2 

( + 1)

(19)

 −  − ( − 1) − ( − 1) 

( + 1)

(20)

Country ’s maximization problem (11) can be written as,
1
1 2

max  =  ( )2 +  ( ) + ( − 1)( ( ) −   )
 + ( − 1)   −   (21)
  
2
2
Before we proceed to the solutions, we define parameter  as the ratio between
environmental damages and benefits due to emissions. Therefore,

= 
(22)

The first order conditions for the welfare maximization yield two reaction functions corresponding to the equilibrium   and  . Since countries are identical, the
tariﬀ and pollution tax will be identical for all countries. Hence, imposing   =  
and  =  in country ’s reaction functions we solve for the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ
and tax. The reaction functions (after imposing   =   and  =  ) are presented
in Appendix A.
11
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Therefore, we have,
  = 

(2(2 − 1) + 1)2 + 3 − 2

2( + 1)(3 + (2 − 1) − 2)

(23)

 = 

(4(2 − 1) + ( − 6)) + 1

2( + 1)(3 + (2 − 1) − 2)

(24)

2((2 − 3) + 1) + ( + 6) − 3

2( + 1)(3 + (2 − 1) − 2)

(25)

The domestic quantity is given by,
 = 

The quantity imported from country  is equal to its quantity exported3 . That
is,
 = 
 = 

3 − 2(2 − 1) − 1

2( + 1)(3 + (2 − 1) − 2)

(26)

2 − 1

3 + (2 − 1) − 2

(27)

The total quantity consumed in country  is equal to its total quantity produced.
That is,
 =  = 

The aggregate consumption level (which is equal to the aggregate production
level) is,
2 − 1

3 + (2 − 1) − 2

(28)

(2 − 1)(4 − ((2 − 5) + 2) − 3)

2(3 + (2 − 1) − 2)2

(29)

 = 

Given our assumption that each unit of the nonnumeraire good produced generates one unit of pollution emission, equation (28) represents the aggregate emissions as well.
Country’s  welfare is given by,
W = 2 

The world market-clearing condition, which requires that global production of
the good to be equal to its global consumption, is satisfied.
3

Imports are non-negative for all   0 and  ≤

3−1
2(2−1) .

12
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4

Coalition formation

We consider that a set of countries signs an GA aiming at controlling emissions
and trade. We call those countries signatories, while the non-participants of the
agreement are called non-signatories. Signatories trade freely among themselves,
while non-signatories are penalized by a tariﬀ on their imports to the members of
the agreement. Moreover, non-signatories pay a tariﬀ when they export to other
non-signatories. Additionally, signatories choose a common tax level that internalizes the full environmental cost of all coalition members while non-signatories
choose individually their emission tax.
In particular, we assume that a set of countries  ⊂  signs a GA and the
remaining \ do not. The countries that form an agreement of size  = ||,
act cooperatively maximizing the join welfare, while the countries that decide not
to participate act non-cooperatively maximizing their own welfare. Thus, there
are  signatory countries and ( − ) non-signatory countries. Taking advantage
of the symmetry assumption, we treat all signatory countries equally within the
coalition.

4.1

Output levels

A signatory country’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good is given by,
 =  + ( − 1) + ( − ) 

(30)

where  is signatory’s domestic product,  indicates quantity imported from
a signatory country, and  indicates quantity imported from a non-signatory
country.
A non-signatory country’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good is given
by,
 =  + ( −  − 1) +  

(31)

where  is non-signatory’s domestic product,  indicates quantity imported from a non-signatory country, and  indicates quantity imported from a
signatory country.

13
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Using the first order conditions (12) and (13) from the firm’s maximization
problem, we derive the domestic product and the quantities imported for each
signatory and non-signatory country respectively.
For a signatory country, these quantities take the following forms4 ,
 =  =

 − ( −  + 1) + ( − ) + ( − ) 

( + 1)

 =

 +  − ( + 1) − ( + 1) 

( + 1)

(32)
(33)

We restrict the parameter values so that imports are non-negative. That is,
 ≥ ( + 1)( +   ) −  . If a signatory country raises its tariﬀ on imports from
a non-signatory country, i.e.   , then production (as well as consumption) of the
domestic good increases, imports from another signatory country increase as well,
while imports from a non-signatory country decrease. Similar eﬀects occur when
a non-signatory country increases its tax per unit of emission, i.e.  . However,
an increase in a signatory country’s tax per unit of emission, i.e.  , will cause a
decrease in domestic production and consumption, a decrease in imports from a
signatory country and an increase in imports from a non-signatory country.
To derive a signatory country’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good,
i.e.  , we use equations (32) and (33). Therefore,
 =

 −  − ( − ) − ( − ) 

( + 1)

(34)

If a signatory country raises its tariﬀ on imports from a non-signatory country,
i.e.   , then its total consumption falls. An increase in either a signatory country’s
tax per unit of emission, i.e.  , or a non-signatory country’s tax per unit of
emission, i.e.  , will cause a decrease to its total consumption as well.
For a non-signatory, these quantities take the following forms5 ,
 =

 − ( + 1) +  + ( − 1) 

( + 1)

(35)

4

The quantity a signatory country imports from a non-signatory country indicates also the
quantity a non-signatory country exports to a signatory country, that is  = 
 . Also,
signatories exchange an equal quantity among themselves, that is  = 
.

5
The quantity a non-signatory country imports from a signatory country indicates also the
quantity a signatory country exports to a non-signatory country, that is  = 
 . Also,
non-signatories exchange an equal quantity among themselves, that is  = 
.
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 − ( + 1) +  − 2 

( + 1)

(36)

 + ( − ) − ( −  + 1) − 2 

( + 1)

(37)

 =
 =

We restrict the parameter values so that imports are non-negative. That is,
 ≥ (+1) +2  − and  ≥ (−+1) +2  −(−) . If a non-signatory
country raises its tariﬀ on imports from another country, i.e.   , then production
(as well as consumption) of the domestic good increases, while imports decrease.
An increase in a non-signatory country’s tax per unit of emission, i.e.  , will
cause a reduction in domestic quantity and imports from another non-signatory
country but an increase in imports from a signatory country. The inverse eﬀect
occurs if a signatory country’s tax per unit of emission, i.e.  , increases. That is,
domestic quantity and imports from another non-signatory country increase but
imports from a signatory country decrease.
Using equations (35), (36) and (37), we derive the total consumption of a nonsignatory country. That is,
 =

 − ( − ) −  − ( − 1) 

( + 1)

(38)

If a non-signatory country raises its tariﬀ on imports, i.e.   , then its total
consumption falls. An increase in either non-signatory country’s tax per unit of
emission, i.e.  , or a signatory country’s tax per unit of emission, i.e.  , will
cause a decrease to its total consumption as well.
Signatory country’s net imports are,
( − )( − 
 ) = −( − )

( + 1) − ( + 1) − 2  + ( + 1) 

( + 1)

(39)

Non-signatory country’s net imports are,
( − 
 ) = 

( + 1) − ( + 1) − 2  + ( + 1) 

( + 1)

(40)

Thus, global net imports sum to zero clearing the markets. That is,


( − )( − 
 ) + ( − )( −  ) = 0

(41)
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Using equations (34) and (38), we derive the aggregate consumption level which
is equal to the aggregate production level (due to the world market-clearing condition). That is,
 − ( − ) −  − ( − 1) 
 −  − ( − ) − ( − ) 
+(−)

( + 1)
( + 1)
(42)
Rearranging,

=

2 −  − ( − ) − ( − )  − ( − 1)( − ) 

(43)
( + 1)
Given our assumption that each unit of the nonnumeraire good produced generates one unit of pollution emission, equation (43) represents the aggregate emissions as well. We observe that aggregate emissions decrease when the tariﬀ and
tax levels set by either signatories or non-signatories or both parties increase.
=

4.2

Tariﬀ and tax levels

Under the formation of a GA of size  = ||, signatories abolish tariﬀs among
themselves and jointly choose their external tariﬀ (i.e. tariﬀ to the non-signatories)
and tax level to maximize the aggregate welfare of the members. On the other
hand, non-signatories choose their tariﬀ and emission tax to maximize their own
welfare.
P
Signatories maximize the aggregate coalition welfare
∈  =  with
respect to   and  . Their maximization problem is,
⎛

max  =  ⎝
  

1
 ( )2
2

+  ( ) + ( − )( ( ) −   )
 +
( −

)  

−

1
 2
2

⎞

⎠

(44)

Note that a signatory’s profits from exporting to other signatories are equal to
its domestic profits since  = 
 as per equation (32). Moreover, it receives profits
from exporting to the non-signatories after taking into account the export related
costs. There are also tariﬀ revenues per unit of import from the non-signatories.
The first order conditions for the welfare maximization yield two reaction functions. The signatories’ reaction function for the equilibrium tariﬀ   (      )
16
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which is a function of signatories’ tax  , non-signatories’ tariﬀ   , non-signatories’
tax  , and the other parameters in the model. The signatories’ reaction function
for the equilibrium tax  (       ) which is a function of signatories’ tariﬀ   ,
non-signatories’ tariﬀ   , non-signatories’ tax  , and the other parameters in the
model. The corresponding second order conditions for the welfare maximization
problem are satisfied (see Appendix B).
Non-signatories maximize their own welfare  with respect to   and  .
Their maximization problem is,
⎛

max  = ⎝

  

1
 ( )2
2

+  ( ) + ( −  − 1) ( )
 +

( ( )

−

  )


+

  

−

1
 2
2

⎞

⎠

(45)

A non-signatory’s profits from exporting to other non-signatories are diﬀerent
from its domestic profits since  6= 
 as per equations (35) and (36). Notice
that the costs related to those exports are equal to the tariﬀ revenues from the
other non-signatories’ imports since they all exchange an equal quantity among
themselves. Additionally, it receives profits from exporting to the signatories after
taking into account the export costs. There are also tariﬀ revenues per unit of
import from the signatories.
The first order conditions for the welfare maximization yield two reaction functions as well. The non-signatories’ reaction function for the equilibrium tariﬀ
  (      ) which is a function of non-signatories’ tax  , signatories’ tariﬀ   ,
signatories’ tax  , and the other parameters in the model. The non-signatories’
reaction function for the equilibrium tax  (       ) which is a function of nonsignatories’ tariﬀ   , signatories’ tariﬀ   , signatories’ tax  , and the other parameters in the model. The corresponding second order conditions for the welfare
maximization problem are satisfied (see Appendix B).
The reaction functions for the tariﬀ,   and   , and tax,  and  , levels are
presented in Appendix C. Moreover, the equilibrium levels of tariﬀs and taxes are
presented in Appendix D due to the length of their expressions.

4.3

Full cooperation case

In the full cooperation case, countries abolish tariﬀs and jointly choose their tax
level to maximize the aggregate welfare. Under the full cooperation assumption,
17
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tariﬀs are eliminated from our analysis and all countries choose the tax  that
maximizes aggregate welfare. In this case, the model is simplified to the basic full
cooperation model (socially optimal outcome) of the IEAs’ literature. As a result
the tax level imposed by a country is given by,
 =

(3  − 1)

(1 + 2 )

(46)

The quantities produced and traded are all equal and thus total quantity consumed in each country is equal to its total quantity produced. That is,
 =  = 



 + 3

(47)

The aggregate emissions are given by,
 =



1 + 2

(48)

Each country receives welfare given by,
W =

2 

2(1 + 2 )

(49)

The derived solutions for the total emissions and welfare are equivalent to the
solutions presented in Rubio and Casino (2001)6 where they calculate the full
cooperative level of emissions and net benefits of each country in the IEA model.

5

The stability of an agreement

In the IEAs’ literature, the existence and stability of an environmental agreement
is determined using the notions of internal and external stability as was originally
developed by D’Aspremont et. al (1983) and extended to IEAs by Carraro and
Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994). Internal stability implies that no coalition
member has an incentive to leave the coalition, while external stability implies that
no country outside the coalition has an incentive to join the coalition, assuming
6

In our model,
a representative
consumer in country  has a utility function of the form
³
´
1


 2
 ( ;  ) =   − 2 ( ) +  while Rubio and Casino (2001) assume that the quadratic

benefit function for each country takes the form,  ( ) =  − 2 2 , where  denotes emissions
by country ,   0 and   0. It is trivial to derive the equivalence between the parameters.
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that the remaining players in the game do not revise their membership decision.
We denote the size of a stable agreement by ∗ .
Formally, the internal and external stability conditions take the following form:
internal stability condition,
W (∗ ) ≥ W (∗ − 1)

(50)

W (∗ ) ≥ W (∗ + 1)

(51)

external stability condition,

where W is the welfare of a signatory country and W is the welfare of a
non-signatory country.
The present model examines the formation of IEAs in an economy with trade.
Therefore, we have to take into consideration two eﬀects. The first eﬀect, referred
to as environmental eﬀect, is related to the pure public good provision problem.
Since environment is a global public good, countries have strong free-riding incentives especially when compliance with an IEA is costly to them. That is, the
coalition formation generates positive externalities for non-participants. Thus, a
free-rider country, acting in a self-interest manner, can increase its own emissions
and enjoy the benefits from the overall pollution reduction brought about by the
coalition. In terms of stability, non-signatories’ strong free-riding incentives imply
a violation of the internal stability condition (50).
The second eﬀect is related to the presence of trade and henceforth referred
to as trade eﬀect. In trade agreements, the coalition formation generates negative
externalities on non-participants reducing their welfare (Yi, 1997). Thus, trade
measures can be a key factor in increasing cooperation incentives. The intuition
is that, if non-signatories expect trade barriers, they may have incentives to join
IEAs. In this case, the external stability condition (51) is violated.
Even though in IEAs, members cannot exclude non-members from enjoying
the benefits of a better global environment, in trade agreements, non-members
can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of free trade. Free trade is not treated
as a global public good, thus, when non-signatories express interest to cooperate
(i.e. condition (51) is violated), they will not be admitted to the agreement if
this action makes the existing members worse oﬀ. To that extent, we add one
more condition, called admissibility condition. The admissibility condition takes
19
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the following form,

W (∗ )  W (∗ + 1)

(52)

and implies that even if external stability is violated and non-signatories wish
to join, signatories oppose to the enlargement.
Considering the trade aspect in isolation, suppose that an agreement consisting
of −1 signatory countries is internally but not externally stable. That is, the last
country has strong incentives to join the agreement as well. If the existing members
admit the last country as a new member, they will gain tariﬀ-free access to one
new member country, but they grant the new member tariﬀ-free access to  − 1
countries. The new member must be better oﬀ, however, there is no guarantee that
the existing members become better oﬀ (Yi, 1996). The admissibility condition is
needed to ensure that existing members will admit a new member if they become
better oﬀ by expanding the coalition.
In this context, stability is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A GA of size ∗ is stable if either,
() W (∗ ) ≥ W (∗ − 1) and W (∗ ) ≥ W (∗ + 1) or,
() W (∗ ) ≥ W (∗ − 1), W (∗ )  W (∗ + 1) and W (∗ )  W (∗ + 1)
Furthermore, we want to point out that there is an important diﬀerence between environmental and trade agreements. In environmental agreements, countries can freely enjoy the benefits of a better environment free-riding on others
eﬀorts. Also, they can promote environmental quality by reducing their emissions
even though they may not belong to an agreement. However, in trade agreements,
countries can benefit from free trade only if they are members of the agreement.
Solving analytically for the stability conditions under the two policies, i.e. tariﬀs and emission taxes, has proven impossible thus far.

6

Numerical analysis

In this section, we demonstrate a numerical analysis to study the model and to
provide further intuitions. We are interested in examining the eﬀect of trade on
20
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the stability and eﬀectiveness of environmental agreements. Therefore, we focus on
studying whether the formation of a GA can increase participation incentives, decrease global emissions and improve welfare relative to the corresponding outcomes
of the basic model of the IEAs’ literature.

6.1

The eﬀect of trade on stability for  = 10

We use the following baseline parameter values:  = 10,  = 1,  = 1 and  =
00457 . Recall that parameter  measures the impact of environmental damages
to benefits due to emissions. In the IEA model, a stable agreement exists, though
small, if that impact is low enough8 . In the present analysis, we set a parameter
value such that environmental damages have a more important eﬀect on countries’
welfare. Therefore, environmental pollution matters and countries apply strong
enough environmental policies (emission taxes) to fight climate change That is,
we limit the range of the values of the parameter  so that we generate interior
equilibrium values for taxes for most coalition sizes. When the coalition size is
expanded considerably, the equilibrium taxes of the non-signatories take a corner
solution. In the present analysis, given that  = 10,  = 1 and  = 1, equilibrium
taxes are mainly positive for  ≥ 00415. For that reason we choose  = 0045.
Moreover, working with parameters that in the IEA model generates no stable
coalition only strengthens our hypothesis that trade enhances cooperation.
Table 1 presents the production levels, net imports and consumption levels
for each signatory and non-signatory country respectively9 . The production and
consumption levels for a signatory are given by the following equations,  =





 +(−1)
 +(−) and  =  +(−1) +(−) . On the other hand, the
production and consumption levels for a non-signatory are given by the following





equations,  =  +(−−1)
 + and  =  +(−−1) + .
The net imports for a signatory are equal to ( − )( − 
 ) while net imports

 10
for a non-signatory are equal to ( −  ) .
The analysis shows that trade between signatories and non-signatories takes
place only for small coalitions such that  = 2 and  = 3. In particular, signatories
7

Note that  = 0045 fails to satisfy the constraint (69) since   00433. That is, in the IEA
model the outcome is the global non-cooperation case, instead of the typical coalition of size 2.
8
Parameter  should satisfy the constraint (69).
9
Values are rounded to four decimal places.
10


Based on our notation,  = 
 and  =  .
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Table 1: Production, consumption and trade activities



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Signatory Country
Non-signatory Country
Production
Net
Consumption Production
Net
Consumption
Imports
Imports
−
13913
06643
05793
05007
04225
03647
03094
02511
01818

−
−07251
−00213
−
−
−
−
−
−
−

−
06661
06430
05793
05007
04225
03647
03094
02511
01818

05198
04591
06246
06642
07043
07314
06657
05726
05000
−

−
01813
00091
−
−
−
−
−
−
−

05198
06404
06337
06642
07043
07314
06657
05726
05000
−

export while non-signatories import. For larger coalitions, net imports are zero
(i.e.  = 0 and  = 0), however, trade still takes place but only among
coalition members (i.e.   0) and among non-members (i.e.   0).
Notice that, when members and non-members engage in trade activities, signatories report higher production and consumption levels. That is, the trade eﬀect
prevails. The inverse holds when they stop exchanging goods. In that case, signatories, controlled by the environmental policy11 , tend to gradually reduce their polluting activities while non-signatories due to free-riding incentives increase theirs.
For coalition with size   6 we observe a decrease in non-signatories’ production
and consumption levels. The intuition is as follows: even though non-signatories
increase the quantity they produce and consume domestically (i.e.  ) the total volume of trade among them gradually decreases since there are less countries
outside the agreement.
Figure 2 displays the aggregate emissions, i.e.  (solid line). Additionally, we
include in the graph the global emissions (dashed line) of the IEA model under
11

Signatories set a tax level that internalizes the full environmental cost of all coalition members. Thus, the larger is the coalition, the higher will be the emission tax.
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Figure 2
the non-cooperative case i.e.   = 68966 12 . Note that the dashed line does not
denote the level of emissions per coalition, it denotes only the benchmark Nash
equilibrium case.

Results show that aggregate emissions decrease as we move to larger coalitions.
Clearly, the environmental policy incites signatories to reduce significant their
polluting activities. Moreover, as indicated in the graph, aggregate emissions in
the GA model are lower than aggregate emissions in the IEA model. That is,
the formation of a GA agreement can significantly improve on the basic model of
the IEAs’ literature in terms of environmental performance, especially when the
coalition size increases.
The following Remark summarizes the aforementioned results.
Remark 1 Regardless of stability, the interaction between trade and environment
policies is essential to improve environmental protection.
The following table, Table 2, presents the total welfare for each signatory country, i.e. W (), and non-signatory, i.e. W (), country respectively, for any coali12

Global emissions in the non-cooperative case are calculated using equations (70).
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tion size 13 . Additionally, we include in the table the global welfare defined by
W = W + ( − )W .
Table 2: Welfare levels








1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

−
−04270
−04721
−04821
−04414
−03376
−01676
−00334
00482
00909

−02233
−05188
−04799
−04501
−03605
−02069
−00217
01138
02036
−

−22329
−50046
−47759
−46289
−40096
−28536
−12385
−00395
06375
09091

When trade between signatories and non-signatories is present, the former are
better oﬀ than the latter. Specifically, signatories receive higher welfare than nonsignatories for coalitions with size  = 2 and  = 3. For those coalitions, the trade
eﬀect dominates the environmental eﬀect. On the other hand, in the absence of
trade, non-signatories become better oﬀ. Due to free-riding incentives, they report
higher economic (polluting) activities than the coalition members receiving higher
welfare. We want to point out that in trade agreements, the welfare of the nonsignatories decreases in the size of the coalition (Yi, 1996). Moreover, notice that
the expansion of the agreement improves the global welfare. That is, the global
welfare is maximized under the grand coalition14 .
Remark 2 Regardless of stability, the formation of GA improves welfare relative
to the basic model of the IEAs’ literature.
Figure 3 depicts countries’ welfare and is used to illustrate the eﬀect of trade
on stability. The welfare for the signatories, i.e. W (), is depicted by the solid
13

Values are rounded to four decimal places.
In the non-cooperative case of the IEA model, each country receives welfare W  = −06183
(calculated using equation (71)). The global welfare is W = −61831.
14
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Figure 3
line and the welfare for the non-signatories, i.e. W (), is depicted by the dotdashed line. Moreover, the welfare W ( − 1) is depicted by the dotted line and
represents the welfare for the non-signatories shifted by one. We use such line
to represent graphically the internal stability condition as the vertical distance
captures W () Q W ( − 1).
Signatories receive higher welfare than non-signatories when the trade eﬀect
prevails (the solid line is above the dot-dashed line), while the inverse holds when
the environmental eﬀect prevails (the dot-dashed line is above the solid line). The
welfare level of non-members increases in the size of the coalition, that is, starting
from the coalition of size two and gradually expanding the agreement makes nonmembers better oﬀ. The welfare level of members increases also in the size of the
coalition but only for   4. As long as the trade aﬀect prevails, the global emission
level is still high and as a consequence high environmental damages aﬀect their
welfare. For larger coalition (  4) we observe a significant decrease in global
emissions and thus the expansion of the agreement makes members better oﬀ.
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As indicated in the graph, a stable agreement is achieved at ∗ = 7. The
agreement ∗ = 7 is stable according to Definition: part (), meaning that none
of its participating countries has an incentive to withdraw (internal stability) and
none of the non-participating countries has an incentive to further participate
(external stability). That is, at ∗ = 7, the solid line in above the dotted line
(i.e. W (7)  W (6)). Thus, internal stability is satisfied. Also, ∗ = 7 is
externally stable (i.e. W (7)  W (8)). There exists also a small coalition that
is also stable (according to Definition: part ()) at ∗ = 3 for the same reasoning
as previously mentioned. Note that the coalitions with sizes  = 5 and  = 6
are not stable because they violate Definition: part () and (). That is, at
those coalitions the internal stability is satisfied, the external stability is violated
and also the admissibility condition is violated as well since W (5)  W (6) and
W (6)  W (7) respectively. Hence, coalition members become better oﬀ by
expanding the coalition.
The following Remark summarizes our findings.
Remark 3 The size of a stable coalition increases when trade policies are included
in the formation of an environmental agreement. Emissions are significantly lower
and welfare higher at the stable coalition when compared to the corresponding outcomes of the IEA model.

6.2

The eﬀect of trade on stability for larger 

In order to provide further implications of our study, we present two indicative
examples with diﬀerent parameter values and examine their eﬀect on the derived
results. In both cases, we use a graph, similar to the one presented in Figure 3,
to illustrate how trade aﬀects the stability of an agreement. We plot the welfare
for the signatories W () (solid line), the welfare for the non-signatories W ()
(dot-dashed line) and the welfare W ( − 1) (dotted line) which represents the
welfare for the non-signatories shifted by one.
In the first numerical exercise, Example 1, we set  = 15,  = 1,  = 1 and
 = 002515 . The welfare levels presented in Figure 4. Trade between signatories
and non-signatories takes place for coalitions with size  = {2 3 4}. In particular,
15

Given that  = 15,  = 1 and  = 1, equilibrium taxes are mainly positive for  ≥ 00216.
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Figure 4
the former export while the latter import. For those coalitions, members receive
higher welfare than non-members (the solid line is above the dot-dashed line).
For larger coalitions, such that   4, non-members become better oﬀ. In this
example, a stable agreement is achieved at ∗ = 11 (according to Definition: part
()). As indicated in the graph, at ∗ = 11, the solid line in above the dotted
line (i.e. W (11)  W (10)). Thus, internal stability is satisfied. Moreover,
∗ = 11 is externally stable (i.e. W (7)  W (8)). There exists also a small
coalition (according to Definition: part ()) that is internally and externally stable
at ∗ = 5.
Example 2, presents the case where  = 20,  = 1,  = 1 and  = 001516 .
Figure 5 illustrates the welfare levels. Signatories and non-signatories engage in
trade activities for coalitions with size  = {2 3 4 5}. In particular, the former
export while the latter import. For those coalitions, members receive higher welfare
than non-members. For larger coalitions such that   5, non-members become
16

Given that  = 20,  = 1 and  = 1, equilibrium taxes are mainly positive for  ≥ 0013.
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Figure 5
better oﬀ. In this case, a stable agreement is achieved at ∗ = 14 (according to
Definition: part ()). There exists also a small coalition (according to Definition:
part ()) that is internally and externally stable at ∗ = 6.
When we increase the number of countries (i.e. ), setting parameter values
(i.e. ) such that environmental pollution is important for them and so they take
the necessary environmental policies to fight climate change17 , we find that the
size of a stable agreement increases as well. This result appears to contradict the
main conclusion reached in the IEAs’ literature stating that in a Cournot-IEA
the maximum level of cooperation consists of two members, independently of the
number of countries. However, the close to 70% participation seems to be quite
robust against changes in  when other parameters are kept same.
To summarize, results illustrate that trade along with environmental policies
have an important impact on the stability and the eﬀectiveness of IEAs.
17

There are interior equilibrium values for taxes for most coalition sizes.
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7

Conclusions

There has been considerable debate on the extent to which trade and environmental
problems aﬀect each other. Clearly, trade measures aﬀect countries’ production
and consumption activities. Therefore, if these activities aﬀect the environmental
quality, trade will aﬀect the environment. Similarly, environmental policies aiming
to protect countries’ environment influence the volume of trade.
The present paper examines the formation and stability of GAs. We extent the
basic model of the IEAs’ literature by letting homogeneous countries apply policy
instruments such as emission taxes and tariﬀs in order to tackle the climate change
problem and control trade. In this framework, countries are either members of a
GA or outsiders. Each member (signatory country) has tariﬀ-free access to other
members’ markets. On the other hand, each non-member (non-signatory country)
pays tariﬀs on its imports to the other countries.
Results are optimistic when the IEA model is extended to incorporate trade.
That is, the formation of an environmental agreement can be more successful when
environmental policies are linked with trade policies. Countries have stronger incentives to cooperate and take the necessary measures to protect the environment.
Thus, we can achieve larger stable agreements that reduce substantially aggregate
emissions and improve welfare. Moreover, the analysis illustrates that the size of a
stable agreement increases in the number of countries aﬀected by the externalities.
The main limitation of our study is that the robustness of the derived results is not
clear because analytical complexity requires resorting to numerical calculations.
To sum up, trade measures in IEAs can be an eﬀective tool. Put in other
words, the recommendation that stems out of this paper is that countries should
not negotiate over environmental issues only. Rather, they should negotiate global
agreements over at least two issues. The main concern is that trade policies applied
in environmental agreements should be always compatible with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules and its non-discrimination principle known as “most
favoured nation treatment”, which requires countries to grant equivalent treatment to the same products imported from any WTO member country (General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT)).
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9
9.1

Appendices
Appendix A

Recall that, we define parameter  as the ratio between environmental damages
and benefits due to emissions. That is,

= 
(53)

The reaction function for the equilibrium   (after imposing   =   and  =  )
is given by,
 =

(2 + 3) + ( − 2 − 2 )

 + 7 + ( − 1)

(54)

The reaction function for the equilibrium  (after imposing   =   and  =  )
is given by,
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 =

9.2

(3 + ( − 6) + 4) − ( − 1)(2 + 2 − 9) 

(4 − 5) + 2 + 3

(55)

Appendix B

The second order condition for the signatories’ welfare maximization problem with
respect to   is satisfied,
 + 2 + (2 + 3) + ( − )2 
 2 ( )
 0
=
−(
−
)
2 
( + 1)2 

(56)

The second order condition for the signatories’ welfare maximization problem
with respect to  is satisfied,
2
 2 ( )
2 2( −  + 1) + (  − 1)
 0
=
−
 2 
( + 1)2 

(57)

The second order condition for the non-signatories’ welfare maximization problem with respect to   is satisfied,
( − 2) + 8 + 1 + ( − 1)2 ( − )
 2 
 0
=
−
 2  
( + 1)2 

(58)

The second order condition for the non-signatories’ welfare maximization problem with respect to  is satisfied,
 2 
 + (2 + 1) + ( + 1)( − )
=
−(
−
)
 0
 2 
( + 1)2 

9.3

(59)

Appendix C

The reaction function for the signatories’ equilibrium tariﬀ   (      ) is given
by,

  (      ) =

µ

¶
(1 + (2 + 2 )) − (( − ) − (( − 2( + 1)) − 1))
−(( − 2) − 1) − ( − 1)( − ) 

( − )2 + (2 + 3) +  + 2
(60)
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The reaction function is for the signatories’ equilibrium tax  (       ) is
given by,
µ

( + 1 − (1 + 2 )) + ( − )((2  + ( − ) + ( − 2))
+(( − 1) − 2( + 1 − 2))  − ((2 − ) + 1)  )
 (       ) =
((2 + 1) − 2( + 1) − 2 )
(61)
The reaction function is for the non-signatories’ equilibrium tariﬀ   (      )
is given by,

¶



¶
(( − 1)(2 − 1) + 4) − ( − )(( − 1)(1 + ) − 4)
−((3 + 1 − 4) + ( − 1)) − ( − 1)( − ) 

  (      ) =
( − 1)2 (( − ) + 1) + 8
(62)
The reaction function is for the non-signatories’ equilibrium tax  (       )
is given by,
µ

⎛

⎞
( + 1)(( − ) − 1) + ((( − 2) − ) − ( − )( + 1))
⎝
⎠
−( − )( − 1 − 4 + ( − 1)( − )( + 1)) 
2
−( + 1)( − 1 − 2 + ( − ) ) 

 (       ) =
( − )(( − )( + 1) +  + (2 + 1))
(63)

9.4

Appendix D

The equilibrium levels of the tariﬀs,   and   , for a signatory and non-signatory
country respectively, are the following,


and   =

(64)


where the expression  is given by,
 = (( + 1)5 + (−2 + 2 + 3)4 − (22 +  − 3)3 − (3 − 42 + 4 − 1)2 +
2(−32 + 5 + 1) − 3(3 + 1)2 + (7 + (5 + 1)6 + (−122 + 3 + 1)5 +
(123 − 112 + 2 − 1)4 + (84 + 3 − 292 − 4 − 1)3 + (−54 + 343 + 532 +
13 + 1)2 − (143 + 222 + 11 + 1)2  + (32 + 4 + 1)3 ))
 =
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the expression  is given by,
 = ((24 + (2 −  + 6)3 + (−3 + 62 + 5)2 + (−53 + 62 + 6 + 3) −
(62 + 5 + 1)) + (7 + 2(2 +  + 2)6 + (−73 − 52 +  + 5)5 + (44 + 3 −
72 − 4 + 2)4 + (44 − 23 − 112 − 18 − 8)3 + (−25 + 134 + 373 + 372 +
8 − 1)2 − (53 + 192 + 20 + 4)3  + (32 + 4 + 1)4 ))
and the expression  is given by,
 = (7 +(32 +3+4)6 +(−53 +2+5)5 +(4 −173 −252 −13+2)4 +
(84 + 183 + 282 + 11 − 8)3 + (−84 + 233 + 172 + 6 + 12)2 2 + (25 − 264 −
143 −5−1)2 +(64 +23 −2 +1)3 )+6 +2(2 ++2)5 −(43 +2 +2−5)4 +
2(4 −23 +22 −4+1)3 +(53 +20+4)2 +2(−4 +43 ++2)−3(23 +2 +1)2 
The equilibrium levels of the taxes,  and  , for a signatory and non-signatory
country respectively, are the following,
 =



and  = 



(65)

where the expression  is given by,
 = −(5 + (2 + 1)4 + (−32 + 5)3 + (24 − 23 − 72 − 1)2 + (24 +
133 + 142 +  − 1) + 2(−23 + 4 + 1) + (7 + (2 − 4 + 3)6 − 2(73 + 52 +
10 + 2)5 + (264 + 273 + 602 + 27 − 4)4 + (185 + 184 + 973 + 542 − 17 −
3)3 + (46 − 105 + 644 + 273 − 352 − 7 + 1)2 + (65 − 304 − 23 + 272 +
6 − 1) + 2(33 − 2 − 3 − 1)3 ))
and the expression  is given by,
 = −( − )(4 + (22 + 3 + 4)3 + (−23 + 32 + 3 + 5)2 + (−43 − 7 +
2)−(22 −7−1)−(5 (3+1)+2(33 +32 +5+2)4 −(124 +163 +272 +4−
5)3 +(45 −34 +483 +312 +2)2 +(44 −203 −102 −3−1))−(2 −4−1)2 ))

9.5

Appendix E

For comparison purposes, we present the solutions of the basic model where a
Cournot-IEA consisting of two countries is the unique self-enforcing IEA. In particular, we lay out the solutions derived by Rubio and Casino (2001).
Total emissions are given by,
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1 +  + ( − 1)

 =

(66)

Signatories receive welfare given by,
W

µ
¶
1 2
2 
2
=   1−
(  + 1) 
2
(1 +  + ( − 1))2

(67)

µ
¶
1 2
2 
=   1−
( + 1) 
2
(1 +  + ( − 1))2

(68)

Non-signatories receive welfare given by,

W

A coalition consisting of two countries is the unique self-enforcing IEA if and
only if parameter  satisfies the following condition,
1
√

(69)
 − 4 + 2 2 − 3 + 3
In the non-cooperative case, the basic model gives the following solutions.
Total emissions are given by,
≤



1 + 

(70)

2 (1 − ( − 2))

2(1 + )2

(71)

  =
Countries receive welfare given by,
W  =

9.6

Appendix F

The following list, presented in Table 3, includes the main variables used in the
paper. Note that it is not exhaustive.

35

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

37

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1248 [2018]

Table 3: List of selected notation
Notation

Explanation




 (= 
 )

 (=  )
 (= 
 )
 (= 
 )

 (= 
 )

 (= 
 )








Country ’s quantity produced and consumed domestically.
Signatory’s quantity produced and consumed domestically.
Non-signatory’s quantity produced and consumed domestically.
Quantity country  imports from country .
Quantity country  exports to country .
Signatory’s imports from another signatory country.
Signatory’s imports from a non-signatory country.
Non-signatory’s imports from a signatory country.
Non-signatory’s imports from another non-signatory country.
Country ’s total production of the nonnumeraire good.
Signatory’s total production of the nonnumeraire good.
Non-signatory’s total production of the nonnumeraire good.
Country ’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
Signatory’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.
Non-signatory’s total consumption of the nonnumeraire good.

36

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1248

38

Diamantoudi et al.: International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks -

NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Working Papers are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=73&sez=Publications&padre=20&tab=1
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2018
1.2018, CSI Series, Claudio Morana, Giacomo Sbrana, Some Financial Implications of Global Warming: an
Empirical Assessment
2.2018, ET Series, Berno Büchel, Stefan Klößner, Martin Lochmüller, Heiko Rauhut, The Strength of Weak
Leaders - An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in Teams
3.2018, ET Series, Daniele Valenti, Matteo Manera, Alessandro Sbuelz, Interpreting the Oil Risk Premium: do Oil
Price Shocks Matter?
4.2018, CSI Series, Lionel Nesta, Elena Verdolini, Francesco Vona, Threshold Policy Effects and Directed Technical
Change in Energy Innovation
5.2018, ET Series, Emerson Melo, A Variational Approach to Network Games
6.2018, ET Series, Daniele Valenti, Modelling the Global Price of Oil: Is there any Role for the Oil Futures-spot
Spread?
7.2018, CSI Series, Giovanna d’Adda , Yu Gao , Russell Golman and Massimo Tavoni, It’s So Hot in Here :
Information Avoidance, Moral Wiggle Room, and High Air Conditioning Usage
8.2018, CSI Series, Cristina Cattaneo, Internal and External Barriers to Energy Efficiency: Made-to-Measure Policy
Interventions
9.2018, ET Series, Hipòlit Torró, The Response of European Energy Prices to ECB Monetary Policy
10.2018, ESP Series, Giovanni Occhiali, Giacomo Falchetta, The Changing Role of Natural Gas in Nigeria
11.2018, CSI Series, Nuno Carlos Leitão, Climate Change and Kuznets Curve: Portuguese Experience
12.2018, ET Series, Banchongsan Charoensook, Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models:
a Generalized Sufficient Condition
13.2018, ET Series, Maryam Ahmadi, Matteo Manera, and Mehdi Sadeghzadeh, Investment-Uncertainty
Relationship in the Oil and Gas Industry
14.2018, ET Series, Christian K. Darko, Giovanni Occhiali and Enrico Vanino, The Chinese are Here: Firm Level
Analysis of Import Competition and Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa
15.2018, ET Series, Giovanni Gualtieri, Marcella Nicolini, Fabio Sabatini, Luca Zamparelli, Natural Disasters and
Demand for Redistribution: Lessons from an Earthquake
16.2018, SAS Series, Linda Arata, Gianni Guastella, Stefano Pareglio, Riccardo Scarpa, Paolo Sckokai, Periurban
Agriculture: do the Current EU Agri-environmental Policy Programmes Fit with it?
17.2018, ET Series, HuiHui Liu, ZhongXiang Zhang, ZhanMing Chen, DeSheng Dou, The Impact of China’s
Electricity Deregulation on Coal and Power Industries: Two-stage Game Modeling Approach
18.2018, ESP Series, ZhongXiang Zhang, Energy Price Reform in China

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

39

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1248 [2018]

19.2018, CSI Series, Soheil Shayegh, Valentina Bosetti, Simon Dietz, Johannes Emmerling, Christoph Hambel,
Svenn Jensen, Holger Kraft, Massimo Tavoni, Christian Traeger, and Rick Van der Ploeg, Recalculating the Social
Cost of Carbon
20.2018, CSI Series, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eftichios Sartzetakis, Stefania Strantza, International Environmental
Agreements - Stability with Transfers among Countries
21.2018, CSI Series, Branko Bošković, Ujjayant Chakravorty, Martino Pelli, Anna Risch, The Effect of Forest Access
on the Market for Fuelwood in India
22.2018, CSI Series, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eftichios Sartzetakis, Stefania Strantza, International Environmental
Agreements - The Impact of Heterogeneity among Countries on Stability
23.2018, CSI Series, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eftichios Sartzetakis, Stefania Strantza, International Environmental
Agreements and Trading Blocks - Can Issue Linkage Enhance Cooperation?

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1248

40

Diamantoudi et al.: International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks -

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63, Milano – Italia
Tel. +39 02.520.36934
Fax. +39.02.520.36946
E-mail: letter@feem.it
www.feem.it

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

41

